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ARTICLES
Do We Still Need a Federal Patients' Bill of Rights?
Sylvia A. Law, J.D.*
Since 1997, proposals for a federal patients' bill of rights have enjoyed
strong, bipartisan political support, from Congress,' presidential
candidates,2 and the two major political parties in their party platforms.3
Despite widespread approval, nothing has been adopted, and,
furthermore, nothing has even come close.4 This Article examines
developments in markets, state law, and federal court decisions that attest
to the continued need for a federal patients' bill of rights.
Part I begins with a pair of narratives illustrating the deep-rooted
problems that have generated the extraordinary consensus that federal
legislation is needed to protect patients' rights. Part II briefly describes the
application of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) to disputes about health care coverage, highlighting the
regulatory vacuum created by ERISA's preemption of state law and
managed care's exacerbation of the resulting problems. Parts III and IV
address two controversies plaguing proposals for a federal patients' bill of
rights. First, while the Supreme Court, in Pegram v. Herdrich, authorized
some state remedies for the negligent medical decisions of ERISA plans, it
* Sylvia A. Law is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine, and Psychiatry and
Co-Director of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at the New York University
School of Law. She received her B.A. from Antioch College in 1964 and heriJ.D. from the
New York University School of Law in 1968. Professor Law would like to thank Douglas E.
Julie, New York University School of Law, Class of 2004, for "providing magnificent research
and editorial help, and pressing me to think sensibly about ERISA issues."
The most influential of the early bills was the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act
(PARCA) introduced by Representative Charles Norwood (R-GA) in April 1997. H.R. 1415,
105th Cong. (1997). The legislation was co-sponsored by 230 House members and a parallel
bill was introduced in the Senate. S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997).
' The 2000 Campaign; Exchanges Between the Candidates in the Third Presidential Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000, at A26.
' See The Democrats: The Party Program; Excerpts from Platform Approved by Democratic National
Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at A26; The Republicans; Excerpts from Platform Approved
by Republican National Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at A16. While both parties share
an abstract commitment to "patients' rights," they disagree on the details. See infra Part V.
4 See infra Part V (discussing the details of the political battle over proposals for a federal
patients' bill of rights).
' 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (discussing managed care liability for negligence).
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provided little guidance on when managed care organizations (MCOs) are
liable for unreasonable medical decisions that cause death or disability.
Second, although the Supreme Court, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran,6 upheld some state programs for independent medical review of
denials of recommended care, it left many people without access to such
review. Part V describes two proposals for a federal patients' bill of rights,
focusing on the two questions considered in Parts III and IV. The Article
concludes that even though Pegram and Moran have significantly changed
the shape of the law, we still need a federal patients' bill of rights.
However, the legislation supported by the House leadership in the 107th
Congress would diminish rather than expand patients' rights, and may be
unnecessarily complex and unwisely disrespectful of the capacity of the
states to address complex problems.7
I. EXPERIENCE WITH MANAGED CARE HAS GENERATED SERIOUS CONCERN
This section frames the issues by presenting two recently litigated
disputes between patients and MCOs-disputes of a sort that has become
all-too-typical in the managed care arena.
Florence Corcoran's story8 is often cited by advocates to demonstrate
the need for a patients' bill of rights.9 Corcoran, a long-time employee of
South Central Bell Telephone Company, became pregnant in 1989. Her
obstetrician, Dr. Jason Collins, recommended that she be hospitalized for
the final months of her pregnancy. During Corcoran's first pregnancy,
Collins had recommended the same course and, when the fetus went into
distress, it was delivered by caesarean section. Collins communicated with
the medical director of Bell explaining the factors that put Corcoran at
6 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002) (discussing the preemption of state laws providing for independent
review of managed care judgments of medical necessity).
' This Article, like the major provisions of the proposed federal patients' rights legislation,
focuses on the processes whereby MCOs decide whether medical treatment is necessary and
thus covered by insurance. In an ideal world, the concept of "patients' rights" would also
encompass concern for the fourteen percent of the United States population that has no
health insurance coverage. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS 60-215 (2000), available at www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-
215.pdf. In addition, a more sensible concept of patients' rights would address the
alarmingly high rate of medical errors that result in countless injuries and in approximately
98,000 hospital deaths per year. L.T. KOHN ET AL., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 9 (Nat'l Acad. Press 2001).
' Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1033 (1992).
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risk. Bell's medical director sought a second opinion from another
obstetrician who said that Collins' recommendation was sound and that
"the company would be at considerable risk denying her doctor's
recommendation. "' Bell rejected the advice and denied approval for
hospitalization. Corcoran stayed at home, attended a few hours a day by a
visiting nurse. While the nurse was not present, the fetus went into distress
and died.
The experiences of Basile Pappas" exemplify another common
problem. Pappas was admitted to a community hospital emergency room
at 11 a.m. complaining of paralysis and numbness in his arms and legs.
The emergency room doctor, a neurologist, and a neurosurgeon all agreed
that he needed emergency surgery that their small hospital was unable to
provide. The doctors arranged to transfer him to Jefferson University
Hospital. At 12:40 p.m., as Pappas was about to leave by ambulance, his
MCO notified the doctors that he should be transferred to another
university hospital that participated in his insurance plan. After lengthy
negotiations, the doctors persuaded the second hospital to accept him. He
was transferred at 3:30 p.m. As a consequence of the delay, Pappas suffered
permanent quadriplegia.
II. ERISA's VACUUM: LIMITED FEDERAL REMEDIES AND THE PREEMPTION OF
STATE REMEDIES
The very problems that Congress seeks to address were created by
Congress, with the help of the Supreme Court, through ERISA.
12
Traditionally, states regulated insurance, including health insurance,
through legislation, administrative oversight, and the common law of torts
and contracts. 13 States also regulated medical care through the licensing of
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers. 4 They defined what is
unreasonably negligent behavior through common law and statutes.
1
5
These bodies of state law are complex and take divergent approaches to
common problems.
6
10 965 F.2d at 1322.
Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa.,
Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 122 S.Ct. 2618 (2002).
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 etseq. (2002).
13 R. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 139-59 (1997).
" Id. at 967-74.
1d. at 842-90.
Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society?
(A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57-63 (1986) (describing the diversity of
state approaches to issues of health care access, quality, and costs).
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ERISA was adopted to address the plight of workers denied of
expected pension benefits. 7 Its central provisions require that employer-
sponsored pension plans meet substantive federal standards regulating
funding, participation, vesting, benefit accrual, and disclosure of
information.1 8 ERISA also deals with employee welfare benefit plans,
including employer-sponsored health insurance. ERISA preempts state
laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. But rather than providing
more protective federal rules as it does for pension plans, ERISA provides
little federal regulation of welfare plans, creating a regulatory vacuum. In
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the Supreme Court grappled
with the scope of ERISA's preemption.
A. Section 514
ERISA's explicit preemption clause-section 514-provides that
ERISA "shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. . . ."'9 This broad federal
preemption is modified by a savings clause that provides that nothing in
ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of
any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities., 20 This
exemption allows states to regulate health insurance. When an employee
benefit plan purchases health insurance for its members, it may be subject
to state insurance regulation. However, when an employee benefit plan
"self-insures," it may not be subject to state regulation. This complex
distinction is explored below.2
1
B. Section 502
ERISA's second preemption of state law is not expressed but implied.
Section 502(a) of the Act allows a plan participant or beneficiary to bring a
civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan," or for breach of fiduciary
duty.2 In 1987, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 23 the plaintiff alleged
17 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (2002).
Id. § 1002(1).
19 Id. § 1144(a). "State laws" includes "all aws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State." Id. § 1144(c) (1).
'Id. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
21 See infta text accompanying notes 132-37.
2 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (2002).
2 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
111: 1 (2002)
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that his insurance company had willfully refused to pay the disability
benefits promised by the policy. He invoked Mississippi's tort remedy for
willful refusaJ to settle contract claims, seeking redress for the injuries that
had resulted. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
held that ERISA preempted the claim for two reasons. First, the Mississippi
tort remedy for willful refusal to settle contract disputes was not limited to
insurance claims, and hence could not be saved as a form of insurance
regulation. 4 Second, "the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a)
[are] the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and
,,25beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits....
Further, even though section 502(a) provides that a plan beneficiary
may bring suit "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief" to "redress
such violations" or to "enforce ... the terms of the plan" or the provisions
of ERISA, federal courts have held that this does not authorize people like
Corcoran or Pappas to seek extra-contractual damages when medically
necessary services are denied and injury results. 6 Finally, and most
importantly, in 1989, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme
Court, again in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, interpreted ERISA to say
that if a plan retains discretion to determine what benefits are covered,
federal courts deciding claims under section 502 may reverse only if the
claimant meets a very demanding standard-showing that the plan's
actions were "arbitrary and capricious.,
27
The thick federal preemption of state law is not limited to "laws
dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA ... .,,2' For example,
states have long recognized that insurance companies sometimes deny
beneficiaries of legitimate entitlements. In response, many states provide
that when an insurance company willfully denies benefits, beneficiaries can
recover consequential damages in addition to the contract payments that
had wrongfully been denied.2 9 However, the Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempts state remedies for willful refusal to provide insurance
coverage30 and that federal law provides no remedy for even egregiously
wrongful practices beyond payment of the benefits promised by the
24 Id. at 50.25
1 Id. at 52.
26 Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1321, 1334-35, 1337-39 (5th Cir.
1992). Other circuit courts have followed this holding. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 13, at
1016.
27 489 U.S. 101,110-15 (1989).
28 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983).
ROSENBLATT ETAL., supra note 13, at 142-47.
" Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 63-66 (1987).
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C. The Rise of Managed Care
The rise of managed care has aggravated the problems created by
ERISA preemption. Until the 1980s most Americans with insurance had
coverage that allowed them free choice of providers at the time of care and
paid doctors and hospitals on a fairly open-ended fee-for-service or
reasonable-cost basis.32 To hold down costs, MCOs require prior
authorization for many treatments, restrict access to specialists, limit the
doctors and hospitals from whom plan participants may obtain care,
provide doctors financial incentives to limit care, restrict coverage of
prescription drugs, and impose other constraints on medical care.33 Thus,
the rise of managed care, together with ERISA's regulatory vacuum with
respect to employer-sponsored health insurance, has left tens of thousands
of Americans without legal redress for death or injury due to MCOs
providing substandard care or wrongfully denying or delaying promised
care.
Why would Congress prohibit states from applying ordinary common
and statutory law to employment-based health insurance plans? Or, to put
the question differently, if Congress preempts state authority, why doesn't
Congress regulate these plans? The answer is simple: big business and big
labor persuaded Congress that a state and federal regulatory vacuum
would allow them to negotiate fairer and more effective medical insurance
plans than what federal or state government would mandate. 34 In 2001,
only 13.5% of wage and salary workers were union members.2
III. PEGRAM V. HERDRICH: WHEN ARE MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY UNREASONABLY DELAYING OR DENYING
TREATMENT?
In 1995, a unanimous Supreme Court decision signaled an increased
willingness to examine the sweep of ERISA's preemption. In New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,36 the
3' See infra Part IV.
See Law & Ensminger, supra note 16, at 12-14.
3 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218-19 (2000).
'4 See Marie Gottschalk, The Missing Millions: Organized Labor, Business, and the Defeat of
Clinton's Health Security Act, 24J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y& L. 489, 494-97 (1999).
35 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (Jan. 17, 2002).
36514 U.S. 645 (1995).
111:1 (2002)
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Court held that New York's comprehensive hospital rate regulation law did
not "relate to" ERISA plans, even though the vast majority of plans affected
were self-insured, employment-based insurance plans. v Since Travelers, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the range of state laws that "relate to" an
ERISA plan under section 514, broadening state authority to regulate.
Throughout the 1990s, lower federal courts struggled to implement
the Supreme Court's ambiguous message about remedies for plan
members who suffer injury when medically necessary services are delayed
or denied. Many courts initially read ERISA's preemption broadly, finding
the weak contractual remedies provided under section 502 to be
exclusive.3 9 Other courts, motivated by sympathy for injured patients and
the new understanding of ERISA triggered by the Supreme Court's
functional, "common sense" approach to statutory interpretation in
Travelers, construed ERISA to permit state actions for extra-contractual




Corcoran is a poignant example of judicial willingness to read ERISA to
deny remedies to injured patients. The Corcorans filed a wrongful death
action in state court alleging that they had lost their baby because of the
negligence of their insurer's utilization review program. ERISA allowed the
insurer to remove the claim to federal court and to argue that federal law
preempted the state tort claims. The Fifth Circuit accepted that argument,
finding that the medical director's decision to deny coverage for
hospitalization "related to" the administration of an ERISA plan.
Corcoran asserted that the decision to deny hospitalization was a medical
decision, and that it should therefore be governed by state medical
malpractice law. The insurer argued that the decision was merely one of
" A unanimous Supreme Court found that in interpreting the "relate to" language "[w]e
simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key
term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive." Id. at 656.
E.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc. 519 U.S.
316 (1997) (holding that ERISA does not "relate to" an ERISA apprenticeship program and
hence California's prevailing wage statute was not preempted); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (holding that a New York tax on gross
receipts of health care facilities was not preempted by ERISA, as applied to labs owned by
ERISA plans).
" See infta text accompanying notes 42-45.
40 See infta text accompanying notes 46-57.
" Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1328-39 (5th Cir. 1992).
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coverage under the plan and that, under the insurance contract, it had
reserved broad discretion to make coverage decisions. The Fifth Circuit
held that the utilization review program "makes medical decisions as part
and parcel of its mandate to decide what benefits are available under the
... plan."42 The court read section 514 to save ERISA plans from
inconsistent rules that might be imposed through state negligence law.
Having characterized the decision as one involving what benefits are
available under the plan, the Fifth Circuit held that Corcoran's only
remedy under section 502 was a federal injunction ordering the insurer to
pay the owed benefits. 3 The court was unmoved by the fact that Corcoran
was in the late stages of a difficult pregnancy and could obtain relief only
by showing that the insurer's actions were arbitrary and capricious. The
court stated: "[T]he acknowledged absence of a remedy under ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme for medical malpractice committed in
connection with a plan benefit determination does not alter our
conclusion."" From 1992 to 1995, most lower courts reached the same
conclusions.45
B. Dukes
In 1995, the Third Circuit, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,46 diverged
from this bleak assessment of the remedies available to ERISA plan
members. Darryl Dukes' MCO primary care physician wrote him a
prescription for blood sugar studies at a participating hospital. For
unknown reasons, the hospital refused to perform the tests. Dukes died
within days from an extremely high blood sugar level that could have been
treated had it been detected. Dukes' widow sued in state court alleging
malpractice by all treating professionals and imputing vicarious liability on
the MCO. The MCO removed the case to federal court, which relied on
Corcoran to dismiss the claims against the MCO.
4 7
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that section 514's preemption of
claims that "relate to" employee benefit plans does not apply to state
medical malpractice claims against an MCO. The Third Circuit noted that
42 Id. at 1332.
4 Id. at 1334-35, 1337-39.
"Id. at 1333.
45 ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 13, at 1016-18; see, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan,
999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
4657 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1008 (1995).
"7 Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1994). See also Spain v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp.
1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
111:1 (2002)
8
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS
"a suit 'to recover benefits due . . . under [the] terms of the plan' is
concerned exclusively with whether or not the benefits due under the plan
were actually provided. The statute simply says nothing about the quality of
benefits received., 48 The Third Circuit emphasized that Mrs. Dukes' claim
that the MCO negligently selected and monitored doctors and hospitals
did not involve an attempt to define new rights under the terms of the
plan. Instead, Dukes was attempting to assert preexisting rights under
general state agency and tort law:
Inherent in the phrases "fights under the terms of the plan" and "benefits
due.., under the terms of [the] plan" is the notion that plan participants
and beneficiaries will receive something to which they would not otherwise
be entitled. But patients enjoy the right to be free from medical
malpractice regardless of whether or not their medical care is provided
through an ERISA plan.48
The Third Circuit noted that "HMOs (health maintenance
organizations) play two roles, not just one" in connection with the medical
treatment provided to a plan beneficiary.i° On the one hand, HMOs
function in an administrative capacity, determining eligibility for benefits.i
Challenges to eligibility determinations or contract coverage may only be
brought under section 502. On the other hand, HMOs play "their role as
the arranger of the [plan beneficiary's] medical treatment.' 52 When they
"provide, arrange for, or supervise the doctors who provide the actual
medical treatment for plan participants," and plaintiffs allege that the care
provided violated state malpractice standards, there is no "claim for
benefits" and hence no preemption under section 502. . Nothing "in the
legislative history, structure, or purpose of ERISA suggest[s] that Congress





In short, Dukes recognizes a distinction between disputes about
"quantity of benefits" or "utilization review" on the one hand, and "quality
of benefits" or "arranging for the provision of medical care" on the other.'
Because section 502 only encompasses claims "to recover benefits due ..
under the terms of [the] plan," it does not apply to complaints about the
57 F.3d at 357 (ellipses and brackets in original).
Id. at 358.
'o Id. at 361.
SI Id. at 360.
52 Id. at 361.
Id. at 360.
5 Id. at 357.
5 Id. at 358-60.
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quality of services actually provided. Hence, state remedies are not
preempted. 6 Since 1995, most courts have followed the Dukes approach.
7
C. Pegram
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered the same issues in a different
context. "s Cynthia Herdrich had employment-based health insurance with
a physician-controlled MCO. Herdrich experienced acute abdominal pain
and consulted her MCO doctor, Lori Pegram. Dr. Pegram found a six - to
- eight-inch inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen and ordered an
ultrasound. Pegram decided that Herdrich could wait for eight days to
have the test done at a MCO-controlled facility fifty miles away. While
waiting for her test, Herdrich's appendix burst, causing peritonitis.
Pegram was a co-owner of the MCO, and her compensation increased
if she limited testing. Herdrich sued in state court, seeking to hold Pegram
and the MCO liable for negligence and fraud. The MCO removed the
action to federal court and argued that Herdrich's claims were preempted
by ERISA. In light of Dukes and its progeny, most plaintiff attorneys would
have contended that the dispute was one about "quality of benefits" and
the "arranging for the provision of medical care." Herdrich's lawyer,
however, chose not to contest the removal to federal court. Rather, counsel
formulated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 502
based on the allegation that the MCO provided doctors financial incentives
inconsistent with their responsibilities to patients. Herdrich sought to have
the MCO profits returned to patients. The Seventh Circuit held that a
federal claim for breach of fiduciary duty is cognizable "where physicians
delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper
care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their
bonuses. "
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous
Court, observed that MCOs always "take steps to control costs,"60 and that
Congress has expressed a policy judgment favoring MCOs. 61 The Court
found that ERISA plans are odd fiduciaries in that they always have
conflicts between saving money and providing care.6" Employers have wide
56 Id. at 356.
5' ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 13, at 1032-37, 640-57 (1997 & Supp. 2000-01).
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 373 (1998).
60 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 219.
6 Id. at 233.
62 "In every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the threshold question is
not whether the actions of some person employed to provide services under a plan
111:l1 (2002)
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discretion to determine the content of the plan and those decisions are
not fiduciary.63 Citing Dukes, the Court recognized a distinction similar to
that drawn by the Third Circuit:
[P]ure "eligibility decisions" turn on the plan's coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for its treatment. "Treatment decisions,"
by contrast, are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a
patient's condition: given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is
the appropriate medical response?64
The Court noted that eligibility and treatment decisions are often
"inextricably mixed."65 Congress "did not intend... HMOs to be treated as
a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting
through its physicians., 66 The Court concluded that "mixed treatment and
eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under
ERISA ....
While the Court rejected Herdrich's effort to hold the MCO liable on
a federal claim for breach of fiduciary duty, it ruled that ERISA would not
preempt a state law claim for negligence, malpractice, and vicarious
liability. The Court noted:
[Tihe defense of any HMO [to a federal claim of breach of fiduciary
duty] would be that its physician did not act out of financial interest but
for good medical reasons, the plausibility of which would require
reference to standards of reasonable and customary medical practice in
like circumstances. That, of course, is the traditional standard of the
common law. ... Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of fiduciary
breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision would boil down
to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but
the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against
physicians. What would be the value to the plan participant of having this
kind of ERISA fiduciary action? It would simply apply the law already
available in state courts and federal diversity actions today.
It would come as news to Corcoran that ERISA did not preempt her
adversely affected a plan beneficiary's interest, but whether that person was acting as a
fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to
complaint." Id. at 226.
63 Id. (citing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887(1996)).
" Id. at 227.
6' Id. at 229.
6Id. at 231.
67 Id. at 211.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
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state negligence claim against her MCO for its mixed eligibility / medical-
necessity decision. In denying Herdrich's federal claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, the Court appears to affirm the availability of state
negligence law to test the reasonableness of mixed medical and eligibility
decisions made by ERISA plans. The Department of Labor (DOL), the
federal agency responsible for enforcing section 502, reads Pegram as
holding "that treatment decisions and mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions by physician employees of an HMO are governed by state
malpractice standards and not ERISA fiduciary standards., 69 Most academic
commentators agree that Pegram allows state law to impose basic
malpractice norms on MCO medical care decisions.0
D. The Importance of Pegram
Lower courts have disagreed over the implications of Pegram as well as
whether particular MCO actions are fairly characterized as "eligibility
decisions" or "treatment decisions." The Third Circuit, a pioneer in Dukes,
found that an MCO doctor's refusal to hospitalize a depressed patient, who
subsequently committed suicide, "falls on the standard of care, not the
denial of benefits side of the line," and hence that the medical malpractice
claim could proceed in state court.7' Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that Pappas' claim that delayed approval of emergency surgery
constituted a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision," the adverse
Brief of Amici Curiae Department of Labor at 7, U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc. v. Pa.
Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000) (No. 98-1836).
7 Phyllis C. Borzi, Pegram v. Herdrich: A Victory for HMOs or the Beginning of the End for ERISA
Preemption?, 1 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 161, 166 (2001) ("[T]he Court in Pegram
appears to be ready to push even more types of decisions out of the ERISA ambit and into
state courts by holding that HMO decisions requiring physician judgment, even those also
involving coverage issues, are not covered by ERISA."); Timothy S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich:
The Supreme Court Confronts Managed Care, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 187, 191
(2001) ("[T]he decision strongly suggests that HMOs themselves are now liable in state
court under state malpractice law for a host of decisions previously thought to be
immunized by ERISA preemption."); Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care
Liability: Reflections on Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 253 (2001) (arguing for a "personal medical information" standard that
asks: "To make this decision, does the MCO need to know personal medical information
about the individual patient? If the answer is yes, the decision is about the quality of care
that the individual patient should have. If the answer is no, then the decision is a benefit
coverage decision."). But see Louis Saccoccio, Pegram's Significance for Managed Health Care, 1
YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 195, 200 (2001) ("[Pegram] does not mean a shift in how
the federal courts should analyze ERISA preemption questions relating to HMO medical-
necessity decisions.... [It] did not hold that HMO coverage decisions involving medical-
necessity issues are subject to state medical malpractice law.").
" Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir. 2000).
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consequences of which are properly redressed through state medical
malpractice law.1
2
By contrast, in Piyzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,73 the Third Circuit
held that delayed referral to a specialist recommended by treating doctors
was a decision about plan coverage, rather than quality of care. As Wendy
Mariner observes, "it is difficult to distinguish a decision to deny coverage
of an out-of-network hospital, as in Pappas, from the decision to deny
coverage of an out-of-network physician in Pryzbowski.''74 While Mariner
makes a telling point, the Third Circuit offered one possible ground for
distinction. It noted that Pryzbowski's dispute with her MCO extended
over seven months and "could have been the subject of a civil enforcement
action under § 502(a)., 75 A savvy patient in Pryzbowski's situation might
have concluded that such delay justified hiring a lawyer and seeking
injunctive relief in federal court.76 Certainly, it is more reasonable to tell
Pryzbowski that she should have sought an injunction than to tell that to
Pappas, whose emergency was measured in minutes and hours, not weeks
and months. Nonetheless, as Part IV explains, for reasons of both process
and substance, it is highly unlikely that a federal court would have
provided Pryzbowski an effective remedy against MCO delay under section
502.
The Fifth Circuit, author of Corcoran, has construed Pegram even more
narrowly. In response to Corcoran and similar cases, Texas had adopted a
patients' bill of rights that included a right to prompt, independent review
of MCOjudgments of medical necessity. Following Pegram, the Fifth Circuit
rejected Texas' argument that independent review was designed solely to
assure that medical care met minimal malpractice standards.77 In cases
seeking redress for injuries caused by allegedly negligent MCO decisions
denying coverage for necessary treatment, lower courts in the Fifth Circuit
have insisted that, despite Pegram, Corcoran remains binding law and hence
preempts such state medical malpractice claims against MCOs.
78
72 Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001). See infra text accompanying note 88.
7' 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001).
71 Mariner, supra note 70, at 265.
7' 245 F.3d at 273.
76 Id. at 273-74.
"Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000).
See Tran v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, No. 3:00-CV-1559-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039
(D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2001); Calad v. CIGNA Healthcare of Tex., No. 3:00-CV-2693-H, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8538 (D. Tex. June 20, 2001).
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E. Managed Care and State Liability Rules
For aggrieved patients, the question of ERISA preemption is only the
first step. 79 Even if ERISA does not preempt compensation for their
injuries, complex questions remain. Pegram holds that plaintiffs are entitled
to the remedies offered by "the law already available in state courts."80 When a
person or organization causes injury, state common law and statutes
ordinarily determine whether compensation is available. Recovery depends
upon substantive liability principles, procedural rules, evidentiary
standards, limits on damages, the ability to find a lawyer, the attitudes of
judges and juries, and other factors-all of which vary by state.
One point is clear, however. Even in the context of ERISA plans and
managed care, doctors may be liable for medical malpractice if they do not
meet professional norms. Corcoran could have sued Collins for not
keeping her in the hospital despite the MCO's determination that the bill
would not be paid, even though Collins struggled on her behalf against the
MCO.81 Indeed, Pappas recovered damages against the doctors who did
their best to get him emergency treatment that they themselves were
unable to provide. In short, if a doctor violates professional medical
standards, he or she can be held liable, even if the MCO refuses to cover
the recommended care.83 "Medical malpractice plaintiffs need only show
71 Curiously, while the Third and Fifth Circuits have grappled with whether Pegram allows
state law negligence claims against MCOs that delay or deny medically necessary treatment,
there are few cases in other circuits. Given the millions of people insured through ERISA
plans, and the frequency of contestable judgments of medical necessity, this lack of legal
activity is hard to understand. For cases supporting state liability, see Isaac v. Seabury &
Smith, No. IPOl-1437B/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413 (S. D. Ind. July 5, 2002) (holding
that after Pegram, a complaint alleging negligence in making a medical-necessity
determination is not completely preempted by ERISA and that state courts should decide
whether the defendant was negligent and whether the state cause of action conflicts with
ERISA) and Rivers v. Health Options Connect, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
(holding that after Dukes, a well-pleaded complaint alleging negligence in a medical-
necessity determination is not removable to federal court). For a case supporting ERISA
preemption, see Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 208 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
despite Pegram, state negligence claims challenging medical-necessity determinations are
preempted by ERISA).
530 U.S. 211, 235 (2000) (emphasis added).
8' Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
82 Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 889-91 (Pa. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa.
2001).
8' Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), petition for review dismissed, 741
P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987). The patient's doctor recommended extended hospitalization. When
the insurer denied approval, the patient was discharged. Her condition worsened and her
leg had to be amputated. The court rejected her negligence claim against the MCO. The
court noted that "it was for the patient's treating physician to decide the course of
111:l1(2002)
14
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS
that the deviation from the standard of medical care occurred; they are not
required to show why it occurred. 8 4 "A health care provider's deviation
from the standard of care is actionable whether it was occasioned by
inadvertence, ignorance, mistake, superstition" or the MCO's financial
85incentives for denial of coverage.
While holding physicians liable for malpractice provides some.
protection to patients, concentrating liability on physicians is troublesome
for several reasons. 6 First, many patients are understandably reluctant to
sue the doctor who went the second and third mile attempting to persuade
an MCO to approve appropriate treatment. Second, when MCOs create
powerful financial and bureaucratic incentives encouraging doctors to
refuse or delay care, it seems fundamentally unfair to immunize the MCO
from liability if the incentives they create lead to unnecessary death and
disability. Third, the standards for holding physicians liable for medical
malpractice are, contrary to popular belief, highly demanding. A doctor
can be liable only on the basis of expert testimony that the physician did
something that no reasonable doctor would have done, and that the act or
81omission caused the plaintiff's injury.
If a doctor is an employee, then under ordinary principles of vicarious
liability, the employer hospital or MCO can be held liable for the
physician's negligence. 8   However, most doctors are independent
contractors, not employees, thus immunizing hospitals and MCOs from
liability under conventional formulations of vicarious liability. 9 In the
hospital context, many courts have relied on concepts of apparent or
ostensible agency to hold hospitals vicariously liable, particularly where the
doctor is selected by the hospital rather than the patient.90 In the managed
care context, since Dukes, virtually all courts, including the Fifth Circuit,
have held that ERISA does not preempt claims seeking to hold an MCO
treatment that was medically necessary to treat the ailment.... The decision to discharge is,
therefore, the responsibility of the patient's own treating doctor." Id. at 819.
84 Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137,
1146 (E.D. Va. 1997).
85 id.
" The American Medical Association supports consumers in seeking ERISA reform,
emphasizing patient protection and professional judgment. See Robert Pear, Patients'Rights
Bill Revised in Bid for Passage in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.13, 2000, at A21.
17 ROSENBLATT ETAL., supra note13, at 844-78.
' Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a hospital is vicariously liable for
the negligence of physician employees), rev'd on other grounds, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001);
Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. at 1146
(holding the same for MCOs).
89 ROSENBiATT ET AL., supra note 13, at 921-27.
90 Id.
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vicariously liable for the negligence of its participating physicians.9'
But, even if ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability claims, plaintiffs
must show that a doctor can fairly be called an agent of an MCO. Most
patients have little idea how physicians in their MCOs are selected. Thus, it
is difficult to claim "ostensible agency" resting on the assertion that the
patient assumed the MCO was exercising control over the selection and
supervision of participating physicians. While early cases were divided,92
more recent cases have held MCOs vicariously liable under the doctrine of
"apparent authority" for the acts of their independent contractor
physicians. For example, in 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court held an MCO
liable for a specialist's negligence under an apparent agency theory even
though the plaintiff's primary care doctor selected the specialist.
"Plaintiff's reliance upon ... [the MCO] was inherent in ... [the MCO's]
method of operation.
93
Another major question is whether MCOs can be held directly, or
corporately, liable for constructing programs that are unreasonably likely
to allow or encourage medical negligence. Pegram makes plain that
managing care, including the use of financial incentives and utilization
review to assure that care is necessary, is not per se unreasonable 94 and is
not subject to federal challenge under section 502 as a violation of
fiduciary obligations.' On the other hand, the Supreme Court has opened
the door to the possibility that treatment decisions-choices about how to
diagnose and treat a patient's condition-and mixed eligibility / treatment
decisions may be challenged under state negligence law.96 Given this
tension, it is difficult to know whether state tort remedies might
nonetheless be preempted under section 514 "until some more precise
definition is afforded to any duties being ascribed to . . . [ERISA plans]
under state tort law.,
97
Similarly, because ERISA has been broadly construed to preempt state
9' The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that medical negligence claims
against HMOs for vicarious liability are not within the scope of section 502(a) and,
therefore, are not completely preempted because they involve conduct by the HMO in its
capacity as provider and arranger of health services and not as plan administrator. Id. at
356; see, e.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000),
reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000); Rice v. Paschal, 65 F.3d 637, 646
(7th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1995).
92 ROSENBLATF ETAL., supra note 13, at 1037-45.
"Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 769 (Ill. 1999).
530 U.S. 211, 220-21 (2000). See also, Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J.,
dissenting).
530 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 232.
17 Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d at 1098 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
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negligence claims asserting that MCOs unreasonably constructed programs
to deny care, there is little law describing what is reasonable in the
managed care context. Concern with costs is not, by itself, a mark of
negligence. It is only when risk and severity of injury exceed the costs of
precautions that the law concludes that a defendant's actions were
unreasonable. 98 The notion that there are only two polar positions-
complete freedom to impose utilization controls and financial incentives to
deny care, or absolute prohibition of any consideration of cost-is foreign
to the basic precepts of negligence law. Because of ERISA preemption, the
nation is left with the formidable task of defining what constitutes
"reasonable" cost-containment measures.
State courts have begun this task for MCOs that are not governed by
ERISA." For example, in 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of institutional or corporate negligence allowed Shawndale Jones
to sue her MCO for institutional wrongdoing."' Jones could sue because
she was insured through Medicaid and her claim was therefore not
preempted by ERISA. The three-month-old plaintiff had become feverish,
constipated, and fussy. After a long delay, her MCO-assigned doctor
recommended castor oil over the telephone. Jones' condition deteriorated
and her mother took her to an emergency room. Jones was diagnosed with
bacterial meningitis and suffered serious permanent disability. Her MCO-
assigned doctor served as the primary care physician for 4,500 patients,
even though national professional standards provide that no more than
3,500 patients should be assigned to a single primary care physician.
Furthermore, the MCO's promotional brochure promised that there
would be one primary care physician for each 2,000 enrollees. 11 The court
held that it is "reasonably foreseeable that assigning an excessive number
of patients to a primary care physician could result in injury, as ... care may
not be provided," 0 2 and that imposing a duty on MCOs to maintain a safe
physician-patient ratio would not prove overly burdensome. 
3
9" United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1947) (opinion by Hand,
j.).
" ERISA does not apply to Medicare, Medicaid, and health plans organized for state and
federal employees.
l°Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of II!., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000).
'01Id. at 1126.
02 Id. at 1134.
103 Id.
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V. RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. V. MoRAN: How CAN PEOPLE WITH
INSURANCE ENFORCE THE RIGHTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED UNDER
THEIR INSURANCE CONTRACTS?
All of the remedies discussed previously are directed toward providing
payment to injured patients or their decedents when medical care is
unreasonably delayed or denied. Such damages, in addition to
compensating for losses suffered, may also encourage MCOs to act more
reasonably in designing cost-containment programs. However, preventing
unnecessary deaths and injuries is far better than providing compensation
after the fact. Patients and doctors have a powerful interest in a fair and
expedient process to challenge ERISA plan decisions denying care
recommended by treating physicians. For the Corcorans, after-the-fact
money damages for the loss of their baby is surely a poor substitute for a
review process that might have prevented their child's death.
ERISA offers two solutions. First, ERISA requires that plans provide all
plan participants and beneficiaries opportunity for a "full and fair review"
of adverse decisions on claims for benefits under covered plans. 0 4 Second,
ERISA allows plan participants to sue in federal court to recover benefits
due, or to obtain injunctive relief.'0 5
In 2000, the Clinton administration DOL issued regulations
strengthening the internal "full and fair" review of ERISA plans.' 6 The
rules require ERISA plans to (1) establish and disclose claims procedures,
including the medical guidelines that plans consider; (2) issue decisions
within ninety days from receipt of a claim, or seventy-two hours in the case
of an urgent claim; and (3) avoid using any process, including filing fees,
that "unduly inhibits or hampers" the initiation or processing of claims.' 7
While the DOL recognized that independent external review is essential
for ensuring rapid access to adequate medical care, it did not have the
authority to compel such review. The DOL did suggest, however, that in
the absence of a congressionally created federal external review process,
... 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2002) (codifying ERISA section 503).
105 See supra text accompanying note 26..
10 65 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,254 (Nov. 21, 2000), modifying 29 C.F.R. § 2560 (1998). These
rules went into affect on January 1, 2001, and apply to all claims filed on or afterJanuary 1,
2002. The Bush Administration suspended all federal regulations issued in the last months
of the Clinton Administration that did not take effect before January 20, 2001. See
Memorandum of Andrew Card to All Executive Agencies, at www.whitehouse.gov (last
visited Nov. 20, 2002). Hence, the "full and fair" review regulations remain in effect.
10765 Fed. Reg. 70,246, 70,266 (Nov. 21, 2000).
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ERISA should not preempt state-based external review.0 8 Since 1999, all
but a few states have enacted laws providing independent professional
review when doctors and insurance plans disagree over whether a
particular treatment is medically necessary.'0 9 Circuit courts were split on
whether ERISA preempts such laws."0
A. Moran
Last year, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, the Supreme Court
resolved this circuit conflict, affirming state power to mandate
independent review for MCOs that purchase insurance."' Justice Souter,
who wrote for a unanimous Court in Travelers,"2 wrote for a five-to-four
majority in Moran. Justice Thomas authored the dissent. All of the Justices
agreed that state-mandated independent review requirements "relate to
ERISA plans" and are thus preempted, unless saved as a form of insurance
regulation.1 13  All agreed that independent professional review
requirements are a form of insurance regulation, at least with respect to
plans that purchase insurance rather than self-insure." 4 The majority and
dissent diverged on whether the independent review provisions are
preempted because they "seek to supplant or add to the exclusive remedies
in § 502." Each relied on the Court's 1987 decision in Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux15 to support its position.
Pilot Life held that Mississippi's common law tort action for bad faith
108 Brief of Amici Curiae Department of Labor, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122
S.Ct. 2151 (2002).
"9 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 2178 (2002). This section relies
upon PATRICIA BUTLER, KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION
LIABILTY LAwS: CURRENT STATUS AND EXPERIENCE (Kaiser Family Found. 2001); STEPHANIE
LEWIS, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE 3 (Kaiser Family Found.
2001); KAREN POLITZ ET AL., ASSESSING STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS AND THE EFFECTS
OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION (Kaiser Family Found. 2002)
[hereinafter KAISER PATIENTS' RIGHTS 2002].
11 Compare Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Texas' requirement that MCOs submit disputes about medical necessity to an
independent review organization is preempted by ERISA), with Moran v. Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Illinois' requirement that HMOs
submit disputes about medical necessity to independent review is a form of insurance
regulation that is saved from ERISA preemption).
. 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002).
112 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
13 122 S.Ct. at 2154, 2178. The dissent agreed that state external review requirements
regulate ERISA plans. Id. at 2175-76.
114 Id. at 2163, 2177-78.
115 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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refusal to settle contract claims was preempted as applied to decisions
made by ERISA plans. The Court based its conclusion on two independent
grounds. First, it found that bad faith refusal to settle a claim was not
limited to insurance companies and hence was not saved as state
regulation of insurance. 6 This can be distinguished from the Illinois law
considered in Moran, which solely targeted insurance. Second, the Pilot Life
Court stated in dicta that Congress did not intend to allow the exclusive
remedies of section 502 to "be supplemented or supplanted by varying
state laws.""7
Relying on this dicta, the Moran dissent found that section 502 creates
"an interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme" that
represent a "'careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans"' centered upon "'the development
of 'a federal common law of rights and obligations.' 1 1 8 For the dissent, the
"interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme"
mandated by Congress required only "full and fair" internal plan review-
with no independent expert opinion-and federal court claims for
contract benefits under a deferential standard that upholds discretionary
plan decisions unless they are "arbitrary and capricious.
" 9
Thus, the dissent's "federal common law of rights and obligations"
under section 502 is a common law of enormous deference to the
decisions of plan administrators. 20 Justice Souter found that such
deference "overstates the rule expressed in Pilot Life."21 The majority
acknowledged that there is some tension "between the congressional
policies of exclusively federal remedies and the 'reservation of the business
of insurance to the States.",122 However, it found that the Illinois
independent review requirements provide "no new cause of action under
state law and authorizes no new form of ultimate relief.... [T] he relief
ultimately available would still be what ERISA authorizes in a suit for
16 Id. at 48-50.
'
17 Id. at 56.
18 122 S.Ct. at 2172, 2174 (quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54, 56, and
citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
19 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
'20 The cases in which federal courts reverse insurance plan medical-necessity
determinations under section 502 are rare and involve egregious wrongdoing. See e.g., Doe
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (reversing a plan decision rejecting the
unanimous opinion of all the experts who examined the patient and the plan's own
guidelines); Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
121 122 S.Ct. at 2166.
'2 Id. at 2165 (quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 744).
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benefits under" section 502.123 The majority rejected Firestone's assumption
that plans have absolute discretion to insist that federal courts review
claims for benefits under section 502 using an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. Rather, it ruled:
Not only is there no ERISA provision directly providing a lenient
standard for judicial review of benefit denials, but there is no
requirement necessarily entailing such an effect even indirectly. [Firestone
merely] held that a general or default rule of de novo review could be
replaced by deferential review if the ERISA plan itself provided that the
plan's benefit determinations were matters of high or unfettered
discretion. Nothing in ERISA, however, requires that these kinds of
decisions be so "discretionary" in the first place.... In this respect, [the
Illinois independent review requirement] prohibits designing an
insurance contract so as to accord unfettered discretion to the insurer to
interpret the contract's term. 24
As a consequence of Moran, people in states with independent review
laws who have coverage through an insured ERISA plan have access to
independent professional review of medical-necessity disputes between
plans and treating physicians. Nonetheless, serious limitations remain on
the remedies authorized by Moran.
B. Independent Review and Timing
Questions of timing are important. Had they been in effect, would
state requirements of independent external review have helped Florence
Corcoran and Basile Pappas? Pappas probably would not have benefited.
Many state programs and the proposals for a federal bill of rights require
123 122 S.Ct. at 2167. The majority and dissent also disagreed in their characterizations of the
remedy provided by the mandated independent professional review. The dissent asserted
that the Illinois law "is . . . most precisely characterized as an arbitration-like mechanism to
settle benefits disputes.... There is no question that arbitration constitutes an alternative
remedy to litigation." Id. at 2175. The majority found that "[t]he Act does not give the
independent reviewer a free-ranging power to construe contract terms, but instead,
confines review to a single term: the phrase 'medically necessity,' used to define the services
covered under the contract." Id. at 2168. Thus, the review process "does not resemble either
contract interpretation or evidentiary litigation before a neutral arbiter, as much as it looks
like a practice (having nothing to do with arbitration) of obtaining another medical
opinion. The reference to an independent reviewer is similar to the submission to a second
physician, which many health insurers are required by law to provide before denying
coverage." Id. at 2169. The dissent replied that "while a second medical opinion is nothing
more than that-an opinion-a determination under... [the Illinois law] is a conclusive
determination with respect to the award of benefits." Id. at 2177.
121 Id. at 2170.
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decisions within seventy-two hours in emergencies. 5 While seventy-two
hours is a tight limit for due process purposes, for patients seeking
emergency care, three days is too long. In contrast, Corcoran might have
obtained the recommended care given a seventy-two-hour time limit for
urgent decisions. Even though her MCO was willing to reject the
recommendations of all the experts it consulted, it is possible that a
judgment by an independent, external reviewer would have carried more
weight. In short, the remedies authorized by Moran best serve people who
can pay for care out-of-pocket and then file a federal claim for contract
benefits bolstered by independent reviewer determination that a treatment
was medically necessary.
C. The Self-Insurance Problem
Under Moran, state-mandated independent review is only available to
people covered by plans that purchase insurance. State insurance
regulations, saved from ERISA preemption, only protect beneficiaries in
plans that are not "self-insured.", 26 In 1997, about one-third of the 150
million participants in private, employment-based plans nationwide
received benefits through employer-sponsored, "self-insured" group health
plans. 127
To avoid state regulation, many plans that purchase insurance
characterize themselves as "self-insured." They accomplish this by buying
"stop-loss" insurance to cover claims over a specified amount. Of course, if
the "stop-loss" attachment point is sufficiently low, the employer is really
just buying insurance, rather than providing a self-insured plan. In the
early 1990s, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner issued rules requiring
that, to be considered "stop-loss" insurance, the attachment point had to
be at least $10,000 per participant per year. In 1998, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Maryland law was preempted by ERISA and was not saved by
the insurance savings clause; the Supreme Court declined review. 12 The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners has sought to develop
ways of extending state insurance regulation to these "stop-loss" policies.
29
121 See references cited supra note 117 (state programs) and infra note 154 (federal bills).
126 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. at 732.
127 Employee Benefit Research Institute, Self-Funded ERISA Health Plans, EBRI NOTES, June
1999, at 4. See, Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining
the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997).
12 8 Am. Med. Security, Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 936
(1998).
' Dan Lonkevich, NAIC Revisits Regulating Stop-Loss Insurance Sold to Self-Insured Health Plans,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 54.
111:l1(2002)
22
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol3/iss1/1
FEDERAL PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS
The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have uniformly rejected these
efforts.
3 1°
Thus, under the prevailing understanding of the difference between
insured and self-insured plans under ERISA, it seems an employer who
retains the first ten dollars of liability for employee health insurance can
purchase stop-loss insurance and remain free of state insurance regulation
under ERISA. From a policy standpoint, it is difficult to imagine why
participants in insured ERISA plans are entitled to state-mandated
independent review while participants in "self-insured" plans are not.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, while recognizing this distinction, questioned
its sensibility.
131
D. Bad Faith Refusal To Settle
The tort of bad faith refusal to settle insurance claims is tremendously
important to purchasers of insurance. Without such a tort action,
rational insurers can deny payments and hope that beneficiaries lack the
ability or will to litigate. If the insurer guesses wrong, under traditional
contract principles, it pays only the benefits due under the contract. It is
no worse off than if it had paid the claim initially. In response to this
problem, state courts recognized tort causes of action for bad faith refusal
to settle insurance claims, 33 and most states adopted insurance regulations
to provide such remedies.
3 4
Some state legislatures and courts learned from Mississippi's
experience and crafted remedies limited to insurance, reconciling their
regulatory goals with ERISA's insurance savings clause. 3 5 In 1999, in UNUM
Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward, the Supreme Court found that
California's "notice prejudice" rule is a form of insurance regulation and
1' See Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that there is a
consensus among all four circuits that have decided whether stop-loss or excess insurance
makes a "self-funded" employee benefit plan insured for the purpose of ERISA
preemption).
... Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747 ("Arguments as to the wisdom of these policy choices
must be directed at Congress.").
112 Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance
Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1994).
113 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
"' See Baker, supra note 132, at 1408.
" Moran affirms Pilot Life's holding that to be saved under the insurance savings clause, "a
law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically
directed toward that industry." 122 S.Ct. 2151, 2159 (2002).
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hence not preempted by ERISA13 6 The rule stipulates that an insurance
company's defense based on an enrollee's failure to give timely notice of a
claim is not valid unless the company could show actual prejudice. Some
courts have read Ward to allow state tort remedies for bad faith refusal to
settle so long as a remedy is limited to insurance claims and insurance
companies. 131
However, courts remain divided as to whether ERISA's insurance
savings clause saves a claim of bad faith refusal to settle.1 38 Moran did not
address bad faith refusal to settle. One way of reading the case stresses the
importance of the point that independent review laws "provide[] no new
cause of action under state law and authorizes no new form of ultimate
relief." As Moran emphasizes, plaintiffs who use independent review can
still only obtain contractual damages. 39 Tort remedies for bad faith refusal
to settle could be viewed as a "new form of ultimate relief." On the other
hand, even if section 502 provides the exclusive remedy for enforcing
ERISA contracts, a tort action for bad faith refusal to settle could be seen
as separate from the exclusive contract remedy. Alternatively, Moran could
"' 526 U.S. 358, 359 (1999). As a matter of common sense, a rule that by its very terms "is
directed specifically at the insurance industry and is applicable only to insurance contracts"
regulates insurance. Id. at 359. In addition, the "notice-prejudice" rule satisfied "all the
criteria used to determine whether a state law regulates the 'business of insurance' within
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act." Id. at 373. First, it "has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk" by shifting "the risk of late notice and stale
evidence from the insured to the insurance company." Id. at 374. Second, "the notice-
prejudice rule serves as 'an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured.' . . . California's rule changes the bargain between insurer and insured; it
,effectively creates a mandatory contract term' that requires the insurer to prove prejudice
before enforcing a timeliness-of-claim provision." Id. Third, the rule was limited to entities
in the insurance industry. Id. at 375. Finally "a state regulation [needn't] satisfy all three
McCarran-Ferguson factors in order to 'regulate insurance' under ERISA's saving clause."
Id. at 373.
131 See, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. Okla. 1999)
(holding that ERISA does not preempt common law torts for insurance bad faith); Colligan
v. UNAM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2001 WL 533742 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2001) (same).
' Compare Rosenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV.A 01-6758, 2002 WL 1769899
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 2002) (holding that Pennsylvania's law on bad faith refusal to settle
insurance claims is not preempted by ERISA as it falls under the insurance savings clause),
with Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2002 WL 1917711, at *5, *7 (E.D. Pa. July 19,
2002) (holding that Pennsylvania's law on bad faith refusal to settle insurance claims is
preempted because it does not serve as "an integral part of the policy relationship between
the insurer and the insured" and hence does not regulate insurance, and that "because
Pennsylvania's bad faith statute provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial forum that
adds to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA, it is incompatible with ERISA's exclusive
enforcement scheme and falls within Pilot Life's categorical preemption").
.. 122 S.Ct. at 2167.
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be construed as authorizing state insurance regulators to require a
mandatory insurance term that says "if we, the insurance company, willfully
and in bad faith refuse to settle a claim, we will compensate you for the
injuries you suffered as a consequence of our bad faith."40 As yet another
alternative, a general state law creating remedies for any willful refusal to
perform a contract could be seen as "not related" to an ERISA plan. Since
Travelers, the "relate to" provision has been limited to laws targeted at
ERISA plans.14' A tort action for bad faith refusal to settle could be just
another constraint in the panoply of generally applicable state laws with
which ERISA plans, like everyone else, must comply.
42
E. State Experience with Independent Review
Few patients utilize state-mandated review programs. New York, which
adopted an independent review program in 1999, has had the highest
incidence of utilization. Between 1999 and 2000, 902 New York patients
out of an estimated 8.4 million covered by the state's independent review
141 McEvoy by Finn v. Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997), illustrates
the operation of the common law tort of bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim in the
health insurance context. Thirteen-year-old Angela McEvoy suffered from anorexia nervosa,
a potentially fatal eating disorder. As no one in her health plan had ever treated this
condition, her doctors recommended that she be referred to a special clinic at the
University of Minnesota. The HMO approved six weeks of treatment but no more, despite
the recommendations of all treating doctors. The HMO urged the girl to join a newly
formed in-plan outpatient group therapy session for compulsive overeaters. When her
weight fell from ninety-six pounds to seventy-four pounds in two months, her mother took
her back to the clinic and paid for her care out-of-pocket. Because McEvoy's mother was a
state employee, her claim was not preempted by ERISA and she was able to bring a claim
for extra-contractual damages and collect for the injuries she suffered.
,4' Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc. 519 U.S. 316
(1997).
... A tort remedy for bad faith refusal to pay a contract obligation might be characterized as
.one of 'myriad state laws' of general applicability that impose some burdens on the
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them within the meaning
of the governing statute." De-Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806,
815 (1997). The Supreme Court further observed:
As we acknowledged in Travelers, there might be a state law whose economic
effects, intentionally or otherwise, were so acute "as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of
insurers' and such a state law 'might indeed be preempted under § 514." That is
not the case here.
Id. at 816 n.16 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995)). The author has not been able to find a case in
which an ERISA plan beneficiary has sought to invoke a general state law prohibiting bad
faith refusal to settle contract claims, arguing that a general state law does not "relate to" an
ERISA plan.
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law sought review.143 This means that 0.01% of eligible, privately insured
New York patients have taken advantage of their right to independent
review.1 44 The experience in other states is similar, though even fewer
patients sought review. 4 A 2001 national survey suggests that the number
of patients who experience difficulty with health care plans is vastly larger
than the number that seek independent review in states that allow it.
1 46
Furthermore, early evidence indicates that many claims presented for
independent review have merit: "The rate at which independent reviewers
overturn health plan denials ranged from a low of 21 percent in Arizona
and Minnesota to a high of 72 percent in Connecticut, and averaged 45
,0147percent across all states.
The small number of patients who seek independent review,
combined with the fact that independent review reverses plan decisions
denying coverage in a relatively high number of cases, leads some
consumer advocates to suggest that many state independent review
programs create unjustifiable barriers.1 4s One major factor limiting patient
access to independent review is the requirement that patients exhaust
internal complaint and appeals processes within their plans before seeking
review. 149 In New York, health plans can require two or more internal
appeals. That, combined with a brief window to file for review, means
that "consumers who remain in the plan system beyond the first appeal are
likely to miss the filing deadline for external review and, thus, become
... KAISER PATIENTS' RIGHTS 2002, supra note 109, at Exhibit A.
14 Id. at vii.
' California reported 421 cases between 1999 and 2001. In Florida, 223 cases were filed
between July 2000 and July 2001. In 2000, Texas had 404 cases, Arizona had 282, and
Maryland had 255. In all other states, the volume of appeals was significantly smaller. Id. at
Exhibit A.
146 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER
EXPERIENCES WITH AND ATTITUDES TOWARD HEALTH PLANS, at
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3172/ChartPack.pdf (Aug. 29 2001). When asked if they
have personally had any problems with their health plan in the past year, twenty-two
percent of respondents cited problems with billing or payment for services, fourteen
percent had problems with the plan not covering a particular treatment or service, seven
percent reported delays in receiving care or treatment, and six percent said they had been
denied care or treatment.
... KAISER PATIENTS' RIGHTS 2002, supra note 109, at v-vi.
148 id.
,' Except for Missouri, every state that offers independent review requires exhaustion of
internal plan remedies. Id. at 12, 14.
"5 Six states have no filing deadline. Twenty-four states have filing deadlines of thirty to sixty
days. In Arizona, a patient has only five days from completion of the internal review process
and receipt of the final notice of the denial to request an independent review. Id. at 13-14.
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ineligible for this protection..... On the one hand, it makes no sense to
demand that patients pursue internal, possibly biased, review processes
beyond the time during which they can seek independent view. On the
other hand, it seems wise to allow plans to correct their own mistakes and
to place some limit on when patients can invoke independent review.
Striking the right balance between these competing considerations is
difficult.
V. PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND EMPLOYERS: WOULD THE TWO PROPOSALS FOR
A FEDERAL PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS HELP OR HURT?
The three most controversial provisions of the two proposals for a
federal patients' bill of rights involve independent review of disputes
between MCOs and treating physicians, the remedies available to patients
who suffer injury or death when MCOs delay or deny recommended
medical care, and the availability of extra-contractual damages when MCOs
willfully refuse to settle legitimate claims.
1 52
A. Independent Review
As a consequence of state legislation and the Supreme Court's
decision in Moran, independent review is now available to patients enrolled
in insured plans in all but eight states.1 53 The bills supported respectively by
the Senate and House leadership both require independent review of
MCO decisions on medical necessity, demand its usage before filing suit,
"' Id. at 12.
.52 Many provisions in the proposed bill are not controversial and are supported by both the
Senate and House. For example, both Houses would require that plans (1) provide
information to enrollees about how they operate; (2) allow enrollees access to out-of-
network specialists when a plan's network does not include an appropriate specialist; (3)
pay for emergency care at the nearest hospital when a person reasonably believes that he or
she is in distress; (4) provide coverage for mammography; and (5) allow people to use a
pediatrician, obstetrician, or gynecologist as a primary health care provider. William G.
Schiffbauer, Analysis of Patients' Bill of Rights Legislation in the 107th Congress, BNA's HEALTH
CARE DAILY RPT. (July 16, 2001). Some of the problems targeted by such provisions have
already been addressed in the marketplace, Id., or through specific federal legislation. See
e.g., Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (2002) [hereinafter
WHCRA] (amending ERISA to require group health plans to provide coverage for "all
stages of reconstruction of the breast on which the mastectomy has been performed");
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 601 et seq., 110 Star.
2874 (1996) (amending ERISA to prohibit plans from restricting hospital lengths of stay for
"normal vaginal" deliveries to less than 48 hours). Howard v. Coventry Health Care of Iowa, Inc.
held that neither WHCRA nor ERISA provides a private cause of action for a WHCRA
violation. 293 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 2002).
' See infra note 155.
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and allow a federal cause of action under ERISA section 502 to provide
contractual benefits deemed medically necessary by independent review.
5 4
Both bills extend these protections to patients in self-insured plans and to
patients in the eight states without independent review programs, 55
imposing a uniform filing fee of up to $25 for all claims.'56 Nonetheless,
there are important differences between the Senate and House
independent review proposals.
First, the Senate bill would establish minimum standards for
independent review organizations, but would allow states to go further in
assuring that external review was informed, unbiased, and fair. 57 The
House bill would preempt state rules governing internal and external
appeals for patients in "self-insured" ERISA plans, preserving the disparity
between insured and self-insured plans. 58 Second, under the House bill, if
independent review upholds a plan's decision to deny a claim for benefits,
the burden of proof falls on the patient to demonstrate through clear and
convincing evidence that the plan did not exercise ordinary care in making
its decision.5 9 Under the Senate's bill, states would be allowed to lower the
burden of proof below a federal maximum; most states require claimants
to show that it is more likely than not that the plan's negligence caused the
harm, that is, the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard.'9
Third, the Senate bill allows independent reviewers to "uph[o]ld,
reverse[], or modif[y]" a benefit denial,' 6' while the House rewrote its bill
with the explicit purpose of denying independent reviewers the authority
to modify a decision. 6 Experience with state independent review programs
demonstrates that the reviewer's ability to modify a MCO decision is
1' S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
115 The eight states that do not have independent review programs are Arkansas, Idaho,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Linda
Greenhouse, Court, 5-4, Upholds Authority of States To Protect Patients, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2002, at Al.
' 6 S. 1052 § 104(b) (2) (A); H.R. 2563 § 503 (b) (2) (iv).
57. 1052 § 401; LEWIS, supra note 109, at 6.
.58 H.R. 2563 § 152. See also BOSTON UNiv. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, PATIENT RIGHTS PROGRAM
WHITE PAPER: DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF LIABILITY TO PATIENTS 8, at http://www.patient-
rights.org/publications/pub00u3.html (Sept. 7, 2001).
"' H.R. 2563 § 402(a) (adding new ERISA section 502(n) (1) (B)). See also LEWIS, supra note
109, at 8; BOSTON UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 158.
160 LEWIS, supra note 109, at 6; BOSTON UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 158, at 10. In
a few states, such as Georgia, state law creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
health plan if it wins the external review decision. BUTLER, supra note 109, at 3.
"' S. 1052 § 104(d) (3) (A).
162 H.R. 2563 § 104 (adding new ERISA section 503(C) (h) (1) (B)). The word "modify" was
expressly deleted from the bill by the Norwood Amendment. BOSTON UNIV. SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH, supra note 158, at 37.
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important.1
63
In sum, the House version of independent review, far from protecting
patients rights, may actually take them away, at least from those who have
recently won protection under state laws and Moran. It strips independent
reviewers of the power to modify plan decisions and makes it more difficult
to enforce benefits claims in federal court. If states are allowed to pursue
different approaches to independent review, ten years from now we are
likely to know a lot more about what is fair and effective, both for patients
and plans. Despite the Republicans' traditional embrace of states' rights,
the House version of the bill would significantly limit state-sponsored
independent review programs that seem to be working well. Governors
across the country have expressed dismay that this would thwart state
efforts to protect patients' rights.'6
B. Recovery of Damages for Unnecessary Death and Disability Caused by Negligent
MCO Medical Decisions
With regard to liability for MCO negligence in determining medical
necessity, again the Senate and House bills have much in common. Both
require exhaustion of internal remedies and independent review.1 65 Both
impose limits on non-economic and punitive damages.'6 In 2002, people
"' KAISER PATIENTS' RIGHTS 2002, supra note 109, at vi.
'6 Robert Pear, States Dismayed by Federal Bills on Patient Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at
Al.
' S. 1052 § 402(a) (n) (9); H.R. 2563 § 402(a) (n) (3) (A).
" Under the House bill, similar damages are provided for personal injury or death
resulting from contract violation or medical malpractice. Successful plaintiffs may be
awarded economic damages (e.g., medical expenses, lost wages) and non-economic
damages (e.g., pain and suffering). H.R. 2563 § 402(a) (adding new ERISA section
502(n) (1) (A)). However, non-economic damages cannot exceed $1.5 million. Id. (adding
new ERISA section 502(n)(4)(A)). Punitive damages are permitted, also up to a limit of
$1.5 million, but only when a plan refuses to comply with the decision of an independent
reviewer. Id. (adding new ERISA section 502(n)(4)(B)). Finally, the House bill permits
states to limit non-economic and / or punitive damages to less than the $1.5 million
maximum. Id. (adding new ERISA § 502(n) (4) (C)).
The Senate bill distinguishes between claims based on contract violation and those
based on medical negligence. In federal court actions for injuries resulting from contract
violations, plaintiffs may recover compensatory economic and non-economic damages,
without any cap. Punitive damages are not allowed. S. 1052 § 402(a) (adding new ERISA
section 502(n)(1)). In state court actions based on medical decisions, damages remain a
matter of state law, though states are not allowed to impose punitive damages unless the
plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the health plan caused injury or death
by acting with "willful or wanton disregard for the fights or safety of others." Id. (adding
new ERISA section 514(d)(1)(C)). Finally, the Senate bill authorizes a federal action
seeking civil penalties of up to $5 million if the patient proves, by clear and convincing
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who speak for Congress and the President asserted that the major
stumbling block to enacting a federal patients' bill of rights is the
limitation on damages. 167 The disputes about damages, while real, mask
more fundamental questions about whether injured people can recover at
all.
The House bill authorizes ERISA plan beneficiaries to sue if a
designated plan decision-maker fails to exercise ordinary care in denying
the claim for benefits or in failing to authorize coverage in compliance
with the written determination of an independent medical reviewer.'68 If
the plan fails to exercise ordinary care in denying coverage, and the patient
suffers death or disability, the plan may be held liable for compensatory
damages. 69 The House bill provides that this new cause of action can be
brought in either federal or state courts, but ERISA provides the
controlling substantive law. 7° Finally, and most significantly, the House
requires a patient to demonstrate that the negligence in denying coverage
was the proximate cause of the death or injury suffered."'
By contrast, the Senate bill draws a sharp distinction between
"medically reviewable decisions" and decisions about coverage, eligibility,
and cost sharing.7 2 This distinction is similar to that articulated by Dukes,
Pegram, and other cases. With respect to decisions about coverage,
eligibility, and cost sharing that do not involve a medically reviewable
evidence, that a health plan acted in "bad faith and flagrant disregard for the rights of the
participant." Id. (adding new ERISA section 502(n) (10) (B)).
As a practical matter, the most important difference in terms of damages is that the
House would limit non-economic damages to $1.5 million, while the Senate would not.
However, a majority of states impose limits on non-economic damages that may be awarded
in malpractice cases. Mark D. Clore, Medical Malpractice Death Actions: Understanding Caps,
Stowers, and Credits, 41 S. TEx. L. REV. 467, 471 (2000). Twenty-one states have a mandatory
cap on damages in malpractice cases. Id. Some limit only non-economic damages; others
limit either general or punitive damages. Id. Finally some states, such as Texas, limit all
damages except for medical care and related expenses. Id. The Senate bill would allow
states to apply their caps to claims challenging medically reviewable decisions. Malpractice
caps have a seriously "disparate impact on patients who have suffered the most severe
injuries from negligent treatment." Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 405
(1994). Because of this unfairness, at least six state courts have found that medical
malpractice damage limitations violate state constitutions. RoSENBLATF ET AL., supra note 13,
at 910-11.
'67 Robert Pear, White House and Senate Hit Impasse on Patients' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2002, at Al.
'm H.R. 2563 § 402 (a) (adding new ERISA section 502(n) (2) (F)).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
2S. 1052 § 402(a) (1) (amending section 502 to add a new section (n)).
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dispute, claims will remain in federal court, and federal standards will
apply. Moreover, the current remedies under ERISA section 502 are
modified to allow patients to recover economic and non-economic
damages (but not exemplary or punitive damages) if the plan fails to
exercise ordinary care and "such failure is a proximate cause of personal
injury to, or the death of, the participant or beneficiary.
73
For "medically reviewable decisions," the Senate bill modifies section
514's preemption of state laws to create a new savings clause stipulating that
nothing in ERISA, including section 502, shall be construed to invalidate "any
cause of action under State law of a participant or beneficiary under a group
health plan . .. to recover damages resulting from personal injury or for
wrongful death against any person if such cause of action arises by reason of a
medically reviewable decision." 74 A "medically reviewable decision" is defined
broadly to include denials based on "a determination that the item or service
is not covered because it is not medically necessary and appropriate," "is
experimental or investigational," or on any grounds "that require an
evaluation of the medical facts by a health care professional in the specific
case.... ,,7 Further, "denial of claim for benefits" is defined broadly to include
"a denial (in whole or part) of, or a failure to act on a timely basis upon, the
claim for benefits and includes a failure to provide benefits.... 7 6 In short,
the Senate bill basically follows the approach suggested by Pegram, allowing
state courts to apply traditional malpractice norms to claims that unreasonable
medical decisions by MCOs have contributed to death or disability.
C. Remedies Against Insurers Who Willfully Refuse To Settle Legitimate Claims
Finally, the Senate bill allows federal courts to impose a "civil
assessment" paid to the claimant if the claimant establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the plan "demonstrated bad faith and flagrant
disregard for the rights" of the claimant and its decision was a proximate
cause of personal injury or death. 77 This provision restores and federalizes
the state tort of bad faith refusal to settle insurance claims that was
preempted by the Pilot Life's interpretation of ERISA.178 The House version
has no comparable provision.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
,' Id. § 402(d).
'75d. § 104(d) (2).
76
1 Id. § 102(e) (3).
177 Id. § 402(a) (10) (amending ERISA section 502 to add a new section (n)).
17' 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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CONCLUSION
As a general matter, apart from technical arguments of statutory
interpretation, which have no purchase in the legislative context, ERISA
plans oppose increased patient protections on two grounds. First,
recognition of patients' rights might drive up insurance costs and hence
discourage employers from offering health insurance. Second, to the
extent that patients' rights are protected by allowing expanded state
regulation, divergent state requirements hinder the ability of national
insurance plans to administer uniform programs.""
With regard to economic ramifications, David M. Studdert and his
colleagues conducted informal interviews with more than fifty senior MCO
executives asking how the proposed bills might impact heath care costs
and access to coverage.1 80 Many executives said that if the preemption of
liability were lifted, they would keep better records. 8' Others stated that
they might liberalize coverage determinations and make greater use of
external review, even when it was not mandated. 18 2 Studdert's group
therefore concluded that the direct costs of liability are uncertain. 183 Efforts
to estimate costs are complicated by differences between the Senate and
House versions, and by the fact that many provisions have already been
adopted voluntarily or imposed through specific federal legislation.'
8 4
Twenty-five percent of the privately insured population, or 35 million
people-mostly government employees-are not covered by ERISA and
already have most of the rights guaranteed by the most expansive versions
of the federal patients' rights legislation.115 Nevertheless, in 1998, the
consulting group Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P. investigated the litigation
experience of this population and estimated that extending the federal
patients' bill of rights to ERISA plan beneficiaries would add between
three and thirteen cents a month to the cost of premiums.8 6 Similarly, a
179 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)
(No. 00-1021); Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. et al., Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2001) (No. 00-1021).
'8' David M. Studdert et al., Expanded Managed Care Liability: What Impact on Employer Coverage,
HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 7.
... Id. at 9.
182 Id. at 16.
Id. at 24.
"8 See supra note 152.
"5 RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 137 (The
Foundation Press 1997).
186 COOPERS & LYBRAND, L.L.P., IMPACT OF POTENTIAL CHANGES TO ERJSA, at
http://www.kff.org/content/archive/1415/erisa.html (June 1998). The report was
prepared for the Kaiser Family Foundation.
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Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study the same year estimated that the
cost of ending the ERISA preemption of state law would be 1.2% of
premiums of all employer-sponsored plans, while a 2002 CBO study
estimated that the liability provisions of the Senate bill would increase
premiums by 0.8%.87 Indeed, state experience with independent review,
which shows that few patients take advantage of such evaluation,""' suggests
that independent review is unlikely to have a major impact on the cost of
health insurance.
Meanwhile, the availability of independent review and the possibility of
damage suits might motivate MCOs to approve care in marginal cases.
Admittedly, given the small number of people who pursue independent
review, a cost-conscious MCO manager might rationally decide to preserve
stringent standards for approving care. However, the same incentive holds
under the current scheme, if not more so, in light of limited liability.
Hence, cost alone would not override the need for a federal patients' bill
of rights. Insurance plans' concerns over their ability to apply uniform
national standards presents a more compelling challenge, but as
mentioned, state experimentation will help determine what uniform
standards would be fair and effective, both for patients and plans.
The Senate proposal allows for such experimentation without hurting
patients. Consider what could have happened with Corcoran and Pappas if
the ERISA revisions proposed by the House or the Senate were in effect.
Under the House's new version of section 502, Corcoran could have
brought a claim in either federal or state court alleging that the MCO
violated federal law by negligently denying coverage. If the external
reviewer had determined that the recommended care was not medically
necessary, Corcoran would have borne the heavy burden of proving the
judgment wrong by clear and convincing evidence. In her case, the
external reviewer found that the recommended care was medically
necessary, so Corcoran might have met this heavy burden. However, the
plan could still have prevailed simply by showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the external reviewer was wrong. Moreover, Corcoran's
biggest problem would have been to show that the MCO's denial of the
recommended hospitalization was the proximate cause of her injury. In the
twentieth century, we came to appreciate that the search for the proximate
cause of most phenomena is both illusive, and, in the liability context,
designed to protect defendants. The MCO would have been correct in
asserting that many causes contributed to the tragic loss of Corcoran's
S'Jean P. Hearne & Hinda Ripps Chaikind, Patient Protection and Managed Care: Legislation in
the 107th Congress (Congressional Research Service).
... See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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baby. Yet, Corcoran needed extraordinary care precisely because of her
high-risk pregnancy. Under the Senate bill, patients like Corcoran may or
may not have a cause of action under section 502 because their claims
involve a "medically reviewable decision" that the bill leaves to state
common law, which is notoriously diverse. Nevertheless, this fate seems
preferable to the House's proximate cause standard, which would ensure
that few if any ERISA plan beneficiaries will ever establish liability.
Likewise, Pappas would have faced greater difficulties under the
House bill. The House version only authorizes a federal cause of action for
negligent denial of treatment. Pappas was never denied treatment. Under
the Senate bill, the devastating delay he was subjected to was a "medically
reviewable decision" for which he could have sued in state court.
In sum, while it permits state experimentation that could benefit both
plans and beneficiaries, the Senate patients' bill of rights affords true
patient protections. First, it restricts ERISA preemption, allowing all plan
participants to invoke ordinary state negligence principles for injuries
resulting from "medically reviewable decisions." Second, it provides a
federal remedy for serious bad faith refusals to settle. By contrast, the
House version, far from protecting patients' rights, takes them away. While
acknowledging the value of independent review, the House bill so restricts
the remedies available that it subverts state external review protections that
have been affirmed, at least for independently insured people, by Moran. If
the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram allows patients to seek redress in
state court for medical decisions that result in injury, with the full range of
traditional state remedies and ordinary standards of negligence and
causation, the House bill effectively reverses the Supreme Court and
reasserts managed care's bubble of immunity for wrongdoing.
111:l1 (2002)
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